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Abstract 
What shapes a European Union member state’s preferences and why do some states seem much 
more  enthusiastic  about  further  integration  in  some  policy  areas  than  others?  This  paper 
examines  the  factors  which  shape  the  preferences  of  three  of  the  2004  entrants:  Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Based on a detailed study of government and party documents 
complemented by a series of 40 semi-structured interviews, I argue that whilst there is merit in 
many of the explanations used to explain national preference formation in the longer-established 
member states, the key to preference formation lies in vulnerabilities and perceived weakness. 2 
 
Introduction
1 
What shapes an EU member state’s choices for Europe and why do some states seem 
much more enthusiastic about further integration in some policy areas than others?  Moreover, to 
what extent is the process of national preference formation of the new member states which 
entered the European Union in 2004/7 different from longer-standing members? This paper seeks 
to address these questions by focusing on three new member states, Slovakia, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic during their first five years of EU membership. 
Examining the shaping of European preferences of new member states merits scholarly 
attention for five reasons. Firstly, the new member states have brought with them their own sets 
of  preferences,  but  much  of  the  existing  scholarly  literature  dealing  with  the  shaping  of 
preferences, however, focuses almost exclusively on Western Europe (e.g. Archer and Nugent 
2006; Aspinwall 2002, 2007; Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2004; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1997). What accounts have been published so far have tended to sketch out research agendas 
rather than provide detailed empirically-based studies of the new member states (e.g. Copsey and 
Haughton 2009). By examining and seeking to elucidate preference formation in three new EU 
Member  States  this  working  paper,  therefore,  seeks  to  help  fill  a  gap  in  the  literature,  and 
contributes to making comparative European politics truly pan-European. 
                                                       
1 I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-000-22-2786) for funding my research and to all 
those officials and politicians who agreed to be interviewed on or off the record.  In addition, I would like to thank 
Laurence Cooley, Nathaniel Copsey, Grzegorz Ekiert, Seán Hanley, Sabina Kajnč, Tereza Novotná and audiences at 
Brown University’s Watson Institute, the Central European University, Comenius University, Harvard University’s 
Center for European Studies, the Institute for International Relations in Prague, the University of Osnabrück, UCL’s 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the UACES, CREES, BASEES and APSA annual conferences 
for their comments on various iterations of this paper. 
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Secondly,  most  scholarly  discussion  of  the  2004/7  entrants  has  been  focused  on 
accession, conditionality and post-accession conditionality (e.g. Epstein and Sedelmeier 2009; 
Falkner  et  al.  2008;  Jacoby  2006;  Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeier  2005;  Vachudova  2005, 
2009), but the reality of membership also merits a shift in focus towards the type of member 
states they have become and why they behave in the way in which they do. Thirdly, examining 
the  process  of  national  preference  formation  illuminates  the  dynamics  of  domestic  politics, 
highlighting the power and influence of societal groupings, state capacity, and the legacies of 
communism, the post-communist transition and the accession process. Fourthly, given the fact 
that member states are involved in all levels of decision-making in the EU, explaining how they 
reach their preferences provides pointers for the future dynamics of the EU. Fifthly, exploring 
national preference formation feeds into larger debates about the nature of the European Union 
and the relative merits of different explanatory frameworks (e.g. Moravcsik 1999; Pollack 2006; 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). But also undertaking such an exercise can also contribute to 
wider and deeper scholarly enquiries into the nature of preference formation (e.g. Checkel 2005; 
Druckman  2004)  and  why  states  choose  to  pool  sovereignty  and  integrate  (or  not)  into 
international organizations such as the EU (e.g. Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1999). 
This  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  After  a  brief  overview  of  the  merits  of  existing 
frameworks to explain national preference formation I focus on preference formation in the three 
new  member  states  in  a  number  of  different  policy  areas  associated  with  issues  related  to 
liberalization,  harmonization,  distribution  of  funds,  external  relations  and  the  completion  of 
integration.  Although I find evidence indicating some of the existing explanatory frameworks 
such as size, ideology, institutional frameworks, the power of big business and dependency play 
a role in the process of national preference formation, I also argue that the processes of accession 4 
 
and transition as well as the holding of the EU presidency matter. Nevertheless, in the final part 
of the paper I argue the key to understanding national preference formation lies in vulnerabilities 
and perceived weakness.   
 
Existing Scholarly Frameworks  
The literature seeking to explain national preferences i.e. the ‘fundamental motivations 
underlying support or opposition’ to further integration both in general and in specific policy 
areas (Moravcsik 1999:5) highlights a number of potential explanations of why states make the 
choices they do including unique historical experiences (Bulmer and Paterson 1987; George 
1998);  size  (Archer  and  Nugent  2006);  public  opinion  (Nguyen  2008);  ideology  (Aspinwall 
2002);  societal  interests  (Moravcsik  1999)  and  dependency,  both  trade  and  EU-funds 
dependency (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Aspinwall 2007). 
Neither  history,  size  nor  public  opinion  are  especially  fruitful  frameworks  to  explain 
national preference formation. History clearly matters, for example, in the British and German 
cases, but it is more of a master/meta explanation or backdrop than the basis for a testable 
hypothesis. Indeed, what matters about a country’s history in terms of its European choices lies 
more in the resultant sense of vulnerability (or lack of) than in history per se. Moreover, although 
we might assume the smaller a state the more enthusiastic they are to have powerful common 
institutions  and  cede  sovereignty while  struggling  to  retain  the  principle  of  equality (Antola 
2002), an alternative logic suggests that large states might actually prefer stronger institutions as 
it allows them to implement their visions and control smaller states. In addition, although public 
opinion is often seen to shape the broad parameters of policy, restricting politicians’ room for 5 
 
manoeuvre and has been increasing in significance in European politics in recent times (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009:5), European themes remain marginal both in older member states and indeed in 
the three case studies under consideration in this paper (Haughton and Rybář 2009; Krašovec and 
Lajh 2009; Hloušek and Pšeja 2009). Nonetheless, all three of these frameworks should not be 
completely discarded. The history of accession and transition, the lack of clout at the European 
level  and  the  largely  permissive  consensus  of  public  opinion  play  a  supporting  role  in  the 
European choices of Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
Other explanatory frameworks are more fruitful furrows to plough. Aspinwall (2002:105) 
argued  that  much  of  the  scholarly  literature  ‘presumes  that  governments  represent  some 
conception of the national interest in an environment free of ideological competition’, but he 
maintained that parties see European integration through an ideological prism, and respond to it 
on  that  basis.  Aspinwall’s  research  (2002,  2007)  provides  extensive  empirical  evidence  to 
suggest that ideology matters for preference formation in the EU. Nonetheless, the examination 
of  older  member  states  highlights  not  the  change  but  the  continuity  of  policy  despite 
governments of different ideological colors holding power (Paterson 2006; Wall 2008). 
A potential explanation for the continuity of policy can be found in Moravcsik’s (1999) 
liberal intergovernmentalism framework in which domestic economic lobbying organizations, 
especially big business, are central to the process of national preference formation and help 
explain member state positions during the deliberations leading to major treaties such as the 
Single  European  Act.  The  power  of  big  business  is  the  subject  of  much  discussion  and 
speculation across post-communist Europe thanks to the sometimes murky interactions between 
parties,  money  and  patronage  (e.g.  Grzymała-Busse  2006;  O’Dwyer  2006).  Three  qualifiers, 
however, need to be made. Firstly, business in Central and Eastern Europe tends to focus less on 6 
 
the macro level European issues such as the Lisbon Treaty, euro entry and enlargement and 
much  more  on  the  more  prosaic,  but  highly  significant  issue  of  EU  funds.  Secondly,  the 
companies which do focus on more macro level issues are often larger companies, frequently 
foreign  direct  investors  who  are  keen  to  remove  barriers  to  cross-border  trade,  but  are 
simultaneously keen to see the government of the countries where their factories are located 
maintain their comparative advantage in fields such as fiscal policy.  Thirdly, although critics of 
big business claim the corporate lobby’s power is clear for all to see in Brussels
2, the power of 
business, of both FDI and domestic origination, is intimately linked to deeper dependencies tied 
to their country’s underlying economic structure and trade patterns (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1997). Small, trade dependent countries need to carve out niches to remain appealing which tend 
to  involve  integration  and  involvement  in  supranational  bodies  whilst  maintaining  some 
distinctive sources of appeal such as lower rates of tax.  
Moreover,  liberal  intergovernmentalists  tend  to  overlook  domestic  institutional 
arrangements (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2004; Closa 2004), sometimes seeing institutions as 
little more than neutral transmission belts. Although institutional structures are generally more 
important  in  helping  shape  transient  bargaining  positions  than  in  determining  underlying 
preferences, institutional frameworks do play some role in the aggregation, coordination and 
translation of preferences especially during the preparations for an EU Presidency and in policy 
areas where politicians do not express strong preferences.  
 
Choice of Countries, Policy Areas and Methodological Tools     
                                                       
2 EUobserver.com, February 13, 2009 7 
 
The countries of study have been chosen for three reasons. Firstly, the cases provide an excellent 
basis for examining the contending explanatory frameworks. Given that governments of very 
different ideological hues have held the reins of power in all three states under consideration, for 
example,  Aspinwall’s  work  would  predict  some  significant  changes  in  European  choices.  In 
terms of the power of societal interests Slovenia’s history of deliberative democracy, very high 
rates  of  union  membership,  comprehensive  collective  bargaining  arrangements  and  well-
developed institutionalized coordination have all ensured organized labor is much more powerful 
at the domestic level. But does this feed through to Slovenia’s European choices? Secondly, both 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic have held the presidency of the European Council (the first half 
of 2008 and 2009 respectively). Although I acknowledge that holding the presidency is in many 
respects rather unrepresentative, it is also the case that an impending presidency throws a lot of 
issues into sharper relief than normal. Thirdly, whilst the passing of the Lisbon Treaty (and 
discussions  surrounding  the  Constitutional  Treaty)  was  rather  uneventful  in  Slovenia,  it  was 
more problematic in Slovakia and the ratification of Lisbon proved to be a long-drawn out affair 
in the Czech Republic. 
The analysis focuses on three economic policy areas (tax harmonization, liberalization 
associated with the Services Directive and the Laval/Viking rulings, and the allocation of EU 
funds),  external  policy  (further  enlargement),  institutional  reform  (Lisbon/Constitutional 
Treaties) and the completion of integration (euro and Schengen entry). The choice of policy 
areas was shaped by a number of considerations. Firstly, although recognizing these are not a 
complete list of all potential policy areas they have been amongst the most prominent in the 
2004-9 period not just for the three countries but also for the EU as a whole. Secondly, both 
Moravcsik and Aspinwall acknowledged that ideology and the power of big business is likely to 8 
 
be more significant in some policy areas than others, hence we might expect in all three cases 
that whilst a new government’s ideological preferences might change a state’s position on socio-
economic policy areas it might not impact on other policy areas. Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty and 
its forerunners merit attention as numerous scholars have distinguished between two types of 
process:  intergovernmental  conferences  which  tend  to  be  more  closed  and  the  more  routine 
bargaining where interest groups are more active participants (Forster 1998; Menon and Kassim 
1997).  Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty and its forerunners provoked responses not just to the 
provisions, but also stimulated wider discussion and debate across the EU about the degree, 
extent  and  purpose  of  further  integration.  Fourthly,  although  May  2004  marked  Slovenia’s, 
Slovakia’s and the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU, all three states were still treaty-bound to 
complete their integration into Schengen and the eurozone. Whilst Slovenia joined the euro in 
2007 and Slovakia two years later the Czech Republic remained outside. 
Drawing on declarations and position papers produced by the respective governments, 
ministries and major political parties since May 2004, in addition to a number of macroeconomic 
indicators and a close reading of leading newspapers and the websites of key business and union 
groupings complemented by an extensive series of semi-structured interviews with current and 
former government ministers, civil servants and representatives of interest groups conducted in 
Prague,  Ljubljana,  Bratislava  and  London  this  paper  seeks  to  provide  an  overview  of  the 
preferences of the three states and provides explanation of what shaped the choices and the 
changes.  
 
Explaining the Choices for Europe  9 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the stances of the three states during the first five years 
of membership. Although admittedly clarity has been achieved at the expense in some places of 
nuanced differentiation, two things are immediately obvious. Firstly, the stances of the three 
countries are similar in most areas with the exception of the Lisbon/Constitutional Treaties and 
euro  entry  where  the  Czech  position  is  very  different  to  the  other  two  cases.  Secondly,  the 
stances of the member states are remarkably stable.  The remainder of this section will examine 
these policy areas in more detail and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
frameworks.    
 
Insert table 1 about here  
 
Economic preferences  
If ideology holds the key to national preference formation then we would expect to see 
changes  in  the  stances  of  all  three  countries  during  the  2004-9  period,  especially  in  socio-
economic policy given the salience of those areas in each of the countries’ domestic politics in 
the 2004-9 period (Haughton and Rybář 2009; Krašovec and Lajh 2009; Hloušek and Pšeja 
2009). All of them have witnessed the swing of the ideological pendulum at elections time (2004 
and 2008 in Slovenia; 2006 in Slovakia and the Czech Republic), but yet what is striking is not 
the change, but the stability of preferences. Despite governments of different ideological hues all 
have  taken  a  broadly  pro-liberalization  line  on  internal  market  matters,  have  opposed  tax 
harmonization and have been supportive of distributive politics encapsulated in the discussion 
surrounding the budget. That is not to suggest that ideological concerns have been absent in 10 
 
shaping European stances. The Prague Declaration signed in May 2008 with the UK, Sweden, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  calling  for  the  reduction  of  administrative 
burdens on business by 2012 and the 2009 presidency motto, ‘Europe without Barriers’, for 
instance, were both rooted in the ideological view of the then centre-right government in the 
Czech  Republic.  Moreover,  for  ideological  reasons  the  then  Slovak  Prime  Minister  Mikuláš 
Dzurinda was keen to stress he was on the side of the liberalizers when the Bolkenstein directive 
was raised at the European Council in March 2005.
3 Furthermore, on issues such as the Working 
Times Directive Slovene centre-right politicians have even seen the EU as a corrective against 
the domestic left.
4 When the Laval and Viking cases came before the European Court of Justice 
in early 2007 although the Czechs placed themselves on the free movement of services side of 
the debate, it was striking that neither Slovakia nor Slovenia expressed strong views (Lindstrom 
2008). This was linked to impact to which we will return to below.  
 
Insert table 2 about here  
 
Some of the stances are relatively easy to explain. As net recipients (see table 2) and relatively 
poor states distributive politics are central to the shaping of policy. Although different statistical 
measures can greatly alter the contributor/recipient ranking of states, all three are net recipients 
                                                       
3 Le Monde, March 11, 2005  
4 Author’s interview with Anton Kokalj, Chairman of the Slovene Parliament’s Committee on European Affairs 
2004-8,  Ljubljana, April 6, 2009   11 
 
on a number of measures.
5 Striking a deal and ensuring the continued flow of funds to Slovakia, 
for example, was the prime motivation of premier Dzurinda in the run-up to the December 2005 
European  Council.  Moreover,  even  the  xenophobic  Slovak  National  Party  has  shown  its 
enthusiasm for the flow of EU money to Slovakia (Haughton and Rybář 2009); a sentiment not 
absent amongst other parties and political actors in the three cases for whom money can trump 
ideological reservations and indeed a finding not that uncommon in some of the older member 
states.  
A closer examination, however, suggests the importance of powerful societal interests. 
Two examples are illustrative. Firstly, although even under the self-declared centre-right pro-
market government of Mirek Topolánek during the debates surrounding energy liberalization the 
Czech Republic expressed some strong opposition to complete unbundling. The stance of the 
Czech government was clearly influenced by the power of the Czech energy giant ČEZ (the 
second largest company in the country) which has been active in pushing its European agenda 
both publicly and behind closed doors
6, although this was disputed by civil servants in the Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and the Foreign Ministry
7. Secondly, the 
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s decision to continue his predecessor’s opposition to tax 
                                                       
5 For alternative measures see, for example, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budget07.pdf  , 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8036097.stm#start and http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/european_community_finances_2009.pdf . [Both accessed December 8, 2009]. 
6  See  the  dedicated  Evropská  agenda  section  of  the  company’s  website:  http://www.cez.cz/cs/o-
spolecnosti/evropska-agenda.html [accessed on October 10, 2008]. The close links between Topolánek and ČEZ 
chairman Martin Roman were also clear during the so-called Tuscany affair in the summer of 2009 when it was 
discovered the two men (along with other businessmen and politicians) were on vacation together in Tuscany. See 
Lidové noviny, August 4, 2009.   
7 Interviews conducted by the author in Prague June 9-30, 2008   12 
 
harmonization - after some initial signals to the contrary - was largely a response to pressure 
from powerful business interests (Gould 2009). Crucially here, however, the pressure was largely 
exercised by the foreign business lobby in Slovakia. The country had benefitted from significant 
FDI, especially in the automotive industry, which pushed hard for euro entry, but simultaneously 
sought  to  put  a  brake  on  any  moves  towards  tax  harmonization.  Indeed,  opposition  to  tax 
harmonization in all three cases is not rooted in ideology. It has been a constant refrain thanks to 
the power of the business lobby tied to a deeper sense of vulnerabilities. The key here is the 
conditional importance of business: its power lies in the fact that it can play on and articulate the 
underlying economic vulnerabilities. 
In contrast to the business lobby, the other side of industry, however, appeared weak. 
Most  union  activity  focused  attention  on  issues  of  domestic  politics,  illustrated  by  the 
demonstrations versus the fiscal reforms in Slovenia in 2005; the change to the Labor Code in 
Slovakia in 2007; and the widespread strikes in the Czech Republic in June 2008. By their own 
admission  leading  union  officials  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia  acknowledged  their 
influence  on  European  policy  was  very  limited  even  under  governments  of  the  centre-left 
traditionally more sympathetic to the position of organized labor.
8 Even in Slovenia where there 
is  general  widespread  belief  that  unions  are  much  stronger  and which  witnessed large  scale 
demonstrations in 2005 over proposed neoliberal reforms and two years later over a rise in 
inflation following euro accession in 2007, civil servants, politicians and union officials were 
                                                       
8 Author’s interviews with Zdeněk Málek, Deputy Chairman, ČMKOS and Hana Málková, Head of the European 
Integration Team, ČMKOS both in Prague June 27
, 2008, and Evgen Škultety, Vice President KOZ, Bratislava, 
February 16, 2009. 13 
 
unable to provide evidence of clear linkages between union pressure and stances taken at the 
European level when pressed during interviews in Ljubljana.  
   
Enlargement 
All  three  states  have  been  consistently  supportive  of  enlargement  although  some 
qualifiers need to be made. Contrary to expectations that ideology does not have much role in 
shaping stances on external policy, it does explain the position of the Christian Democrats in all 
three countries. They have consistently expressed strong doubts or reservations about Turkish 
accession seeing the EU as a ‘Christian club’, but crucially whilst these parties have been in 
government and Cyril Svoboda was even Czech Foreign Minister for the first two years of Czech 
membership,  the  countries’  line  remained  positive  about  the  possibility  of  Turkish  entry 
(providing the accession criteria are met) albeit recognizing this will take years, if not decades. 
Ideology  also  partially  explains  the  position  of  the  Czech  centre  right  government  under 
Topolánek. In line with the position of British Conservatives, President Klaus and likeminded 
politicians in the Civic Democratic Party (ODS)
9 have advocated enlargement to include Turkey, 
Ukraine and even Morocco and Kazakhstan (Hanley 2008) in part because they believe that 
expanding complicates and thereby hinders deepening. 
More broadly, all three countries have supported enlargement to the Western Balkans, 
albeit now keener to stress the importance of meeting the criteria in part due to the experience of 
post-accession Romania and Bulgaria. Whilst geographical proximity and historical ties may 
                                                       
9 Klaus left ODS in December 2008  14 
 
have some explanatory power the extensive trading links, especially in the case of Slovenia, are 
central to enlargement policy.
10 It explains why Slovenia put the Western Balkans top of its list 
of priorities for its presidency of the Council and invested in this theme much time and effort 
during its six months at the EU helm (Kajnč 2009). Nonetheless, the decision to block Croatia’s 
accession  negotiations  in  December  2008  highlighted  a  deeper  set  of  motivations  linked  to 
vulnerability (discussed below). 
 
Institutional Preferences  
In terms of the debates surrounding the Constitutional/Lisbon treaties ideology played 
some role in the shaping of preferences, although the impact was largely restricted to the right of 
the spectrum where there was discernible catholic conservative resistance to ‘liberal’ Europe’s 
attitude to moral questions. In the case of the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia, for 
instance, the party called in its 2004 European Parliament election manifesto for a national veto 
in a whole range of issues, including asylum, immigration, and on cultural and ethical issues 
(KDH 2004) and opposed the Lisbon Treaty’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The debates surrounding the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty highlight the importance of 
different  factors  in  the  three  cases.  In  Slovakia,  for  instance,  three  findings  merit  mention. 
Firstly, following the 2003-4 Intergovernmental Conference when Slovak politicians invested 
great effort in drawing up a detailed position on a range of policy areas only to discover that 
thanks to a distinct lack of clout at the EU level, hardly any of them made their way into the final 
                                                       
10 Croatia is the third most important destination for Slovene exports.  15 
 
text.  Rather  than  staying  on  the  field  expending  energy  in  a  series  of  fruitless  runs  Slovak 
politicians chose to retreat to the bench and conserve energy for other EU games (Haughton and 
Bilčík 2010). Indeed, politicians left the major role of preparing Slovakia’s priorities for EU 
institutional reform from the Convention to the Lisbon Treaty in the hands of civil servants at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country’s mission and the Permanent Representation to the EU. 
Secondly, the long-drawn out battles surrounding the ratification process of the Lisbon 
Treaty demonstrate not the salience of European themes to Slovak politicians or strongly held 
convictions as to the provisions of the treaty, but rather the instrumentalization of European 
themes for domestic political benefit (Haughton and Rybář 2009). Indeed, politicians from across 
the political spectrum saw Lisbon as a compromise.
11 Thirdly, although Fico expressed some 
views on the future of Europe at the Berlin summit in March 2007 and welcomed the European 
Council’s decision in June 2007 to launch a new intergovernmental conference, Fico’s main 
concern was not the future institutional architecture of Europe, but Slovakia’s goal of entry into 
the eurozone in 2009. 
In the Czech Republic there were stark differences across the political spectrum. Support 
for the treaty amongst the Social Democrats such as party leader Jiří Paroubek was rooted in a 
social democratic belief in cooperation.
12 In addition to strong criticisms from the communists, a 
hard  core  of  ODS  politicians  expressed  strong  ideologically-rooted  criticisms  of  the  Lisbon 
                                                       
11  For  example  the  author’s  interviews  with  Zdenka  Kramplová,  Minister  for  Agriculture  2007-8,  Bratislava, 
February 18, 2009; Pál Csáky, Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs 2002-2006 and Chairman Party of the 
Hungarian Coalition 2007- , Bratislava, February 16, 2009; and Miroslav Lajčák, Slovak Foreign Minister, 2009-, 
London, June 6, 2009.  
12 See, for example, Paroubek (2008b).  16 
 
Treaty,  most  notably  the  party’s  Senators  who  referred  the  document  twice  to  the  Czech 
Constitutional Court. Moreover, President Klaus could not contain his glee when the Irish voted 
‘no’ in June 2008 and took great pleasure in being a thorn in the EU’s side even after the Irish 
voted  yes  when  asked  for  the  second  time  in  October  2009.  Nonetheless,  the  government 
remained  committed  to  passing  the  treaty.  Apart  from  personal  tensions  between  Klaus  and 
Prime Minister Topolánek, this commitment was linked to two factors. Firstly, the vast majority 
of politicians in ODS are much more pragmatic than ideological and secondly, there was a clear 
presidency effect (discussed below). The presidency effect also helps explain Slovenia’s position 
as the country was in the EU chair in the first half of 2008.   
 
Completion of integration  
As the discussion on Slovakia above illustrates, central to the thrust of policy in the first 
five years of membership was the completion of integration (i.e. Schengen and euro entry) and 
the flow of EU funds. Three factors drove this policy. Firstly, it was important for valence issues 
in domestic Slovak politics. Schengen and euro entry were sold to the electorate as evidence of 
the government’s competence and ability to achieve European goals.
13 Secondly, it indicates the 
power of business interests. Fico publicly raised some questions over the date of entry when he 
took office that led to a predictable rush out of Slovak crowns and considerable pressure was 
exerted on the Prime Minister from the large multinational investors in Slovakia to stick to the 
goal of 2009 entry. Fico stuck with the decision to aim for 2009 entry despite rumblings of 
                                                       
13 See, for example, Robert Fico (2007a , 2007b); KDH (2006);  ĽS-HZDS (2006); SDKÚ-DS (2006); Smer-SD 
(2006); SMK (2006) SNS (2006); 17 
 
discontent within his own party. Thirdly, this pressure of business, however, is better understood 
within the framework of vulnerability.  Slovakia under Fico joined the euro in part because of the 
‘threat of capital flight and devaluation’ (Gould 2009:3). 
The completion of integration agenda was perhaps most significant in the Slovak case. 
The explanation for this may lie with Slovakia’s accession trajectory. Having not been invited to 
begin accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 due to a failure to 
meet the Copenhagen political criterion much of the subsequent decade was spent catching up 
with its neighbours and demonstrating the country was a good European. To some extent this can 
be seen as a sort of entrapment - a twist on Schimmelfennig’s (2001) rhetorical entrapment 
during accession - whereby states claimed they were good Europeans, so they went along with 
some integration in some areas even if not that keen. Indeed, accession can be seen as a period of 
preference  sublimation.  With  membership  achieved  those  states  with  the  more  problematic 
accessions gradually begin to feel more comfortable being awkward and sticking out their necks 
declaring preferences which they know will not appeal to all. 
Although completion of integration was also important to Slovenes the main priority for 
Slovenia  in  the  first  few  years  of  membership  was  preparations  for  the  forthcoming  EU 
presidency (see below).  In the Czech case, in contrast, whilst Schengen entry was also important 
there was a much more equivocal position on euro entry. Ideology can feed into the explanation 
of why there is difference between the stance of the centre-right Topolánek government and the 
position  of  the  Social  Democrats,  but  much  of  this  is  linked  to  vulnerabilities.  Indeed,  the 
salience of the euro to Czech exporters was not lost on Social Democrat leader and former Prime 
Minister Jiří Paroubek who feared the impact of staying outside the eurozone. He advocated euro 
entry as soon as possible, ‘in the name of keeping the stability and prosperity of Czech industry 18 
 
and therefore for the entire country’.
14 Paroubek’s sentiments echoed concerns expressed by 
large  firms  in  the  Czech  Republic  which  had  been  expressing  worries  about  the  impact  of 
exchange rate fluctuations for some time.
15 Witnessing economic slumps in Latvia and Hungary, 
this desire for the safe harbor of eurozone membership was only strengthened as the global credit 
crunch began to bite in 2009. Nonetheless, others - most notably Klaus - looked to countries like 
Ireland, observing that eurozone membership was no panacea, claiming that remaining outside 
the single currency had helped the Czech Republic weather the economic storm.    
 
The Presidency Effect
16  
In both the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovenia we can clearly see a ‘presidency 
effect’ impacting on national preference formation in four ways. Firstly, it raised the profile of 
EU issues, provoking both states to consider positions on a wide variety of issues. Prior to the 
EU presidency three successive Czech Prime Ministers, Stanislav Gross, Jiří Paroubek and Mirek 
Topolánek showed very little interest in European policy. Both Social Democrat Prime Ministers 
(Gross  and  Paroubek)  were  happy  to  leave  European  policy  to  the  Foreign  Minister  Cyril 
Svoboda  and  his  ministry
17,  only  invoking  European  themes  when  it  appeared  politically 
expedient as a means of attacking their political opponents. 
                                                       
14 See, for instance, Paroubek (2008a).  
15 For example, Unipetrol (2008). 
16 I am grateful to Jan Karlas for first making me consider the presidency effect.  
17 Author’s interview with Cyril Svoboda, Foreign Minister 2002-6 and 2007-9 Minister without Portfolio, Prague, 
June 30, 2008. 19 
 
Secondly, it contributed to changes in the institutional structure, involving the creation of 
new bodies (e.g. the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs in the Czech Republic) and/or 
the  strengthening  of  others  (e.g.  the  Government  Office  for  European  Affairs  in  Slovenia). 
Although both the Czechs and Slovenes undertook consultation processes in the run-up to taking 
the EU helm the preferences of the governments were shaped largely by the central organs co-
ordinating  the  presidency  and  inherited  priorities  (e.g.  Kajnč  2009).  Indeed,  the  latter  point 
reminds us we should be cautious about seeing the headline priorities of the presidency as merely 
expressions of underlying preferences. 
Thirdly, the stances of some of these key politicians were affected, most notably the 
Czech Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs Alexander Vondra who had opposed the 
Constitutional Treaty. Thanks in no small part to his central position in the Czech EU presidency 
he supported the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty stressing the benefits for Europe and the Czech 
Republic.  This  presidency  effect,  however,  had  far  less  impact  on  the  more  euroskeptic 
politicians such as Klaus and the Slovene National Party’s Zmago Jelenčič Plemeniti. 
Fourthly, in the Slovene case the presidency cast a long shadow over the articulation of 
Slovene preferences for much of the period under study. The preparations for the presidency 
began soon after accession. As Slovenes were generally keen on ensuring the presidency was 
seen to be a gaffe-free success there was a greater focus on managing the task rather than the 
formation and articulation of preferences. Indeed, we can see the entire period up until July 2008 
as a period of sublimation.
18 The majority of Slovenia’s parliamentary parties even agreed in 
                                                       
18 Author’s interviews with leading Slovene officials at the Government Office for European Affairs, Ljubljana, 
April 15, 2009.  20 
 
2007 a non-aggression pact for the duration of the EU Presidency (Krašovec and Lajh 2009). 
Slovenia’s strong preference on Croatian accession (intimately linked to deeper questions of 
insecurity and vulnerability) was only expressed publicly with significant force and acted upon 
with the blocking of Croatia’s accession once Slovenia’s EU presidency had passed into history, 
although thanks to a publicity stunt carried out by the Slovene People’s Party (which became a 
member of the government) in the 2004 election campaign, the issue of the disputed border had 
not been completely swept under the carpet. 
The  presidency  effect  feeds  into  the  large  debates  about  preference  formation  and 
theories of European integration mentioned above. Clearly the EU preferences of both Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic were not formed solely exogenously during the presidency period (and 
the preparations). Many were inherited or shaped by the position in the chair. Slovenia, for 
instance, was keen to be a good manager, hence it pushed for a compromise position on energy 
liberalization  and  sought  to  avoid  conflict  on  the  issue  of  the  recognition  of  Kosovo  by 
recognizing  the  sensitivity  of  such  recognition  to  states  which  feared  the  precedent  such  a 
declaration might have for their own internal political stability (Kajnč 2009). The key lesson 
however, is that preferences are largely domestically formed, but refined, refracted and amended 
by the interaction at the EU level. So preferences are not formed at the European level, but how 
preferences are manifested is the product of interaction. This is the exact opposite to Pollack’s 
(2006) suggestion of how we might marry constructivist and rationalist approaches of preference 
formation.
19  Preferences  are  rooted  in  domestic  concerns,  but  these  may  be  tweaked  at  the 
European level.  
                                                       
19 Pollack argues that we can use constructivist accounts to look at how preferences are formed and rationalist 
accounts for modeling interactions among actors with exogenously given preferences. 21 
 
 
Towards a More Holistic Explanation: Vulnerability and Weakness  
The preceding discussion has highlighted the existing frameworks have some explanatory 
power, but they seem inadequate to provide an overarching explanation. In this section I propose 
an argument which integrates the insights derived from other frameworks, drawing in particular 
on dependency, and suggest the key to explaining a member state’s choices for Europe lies in 
vulnerability  and  perceived  weakness.  Recognizing  the  limitations  of  what  can  be  achieved 
domestically,  integration  is  therefore  advocated  as  a  means  of  compensating  for  domestic 
weakness.  The  theme  of  vulnerability  -  which  has  been  employed  in  international  relations, 
especially  in  work  on  small  states  (e.g.  Keohane  and  Nye  1977;  Cooper  and  Shaw  2009)  - 
appears in the work of Milward (1992) and Moravcsik (1999). The latter, who viewed national 
preferences  as  a  product  of  power  struggles  at  the  domestic  political  level,  largely  saw 
vulnerability within the domestic arena. I would suggest, however, that especially for the new 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe, external and geopolitical vulnerabilities are also 
significant in preference formation. Vulnerability can be distinguished from dependency in two 
important  respects.  Firstly,  dependency  is  a  narrower  concept  which  focuses  mostly  on 
economics. In this sense dependency can be seen as a sub-set of vulnerability. Secondly, the 
word perceived is central to the concept of vulnerability i.e. it cannot be understood merely by 
looking at tables of economic statistics (Haughton 2009). 
All of the key preferences of the three new states (such as liberal internal markets, energy 
security, opposition to tax harmonization, further enlargement and the flow of EU funds)  can be 
explained by reference to vulnerabilities and perceived weaknesses. There are two elements to 
this vulnerability. The first lies in economics and is intimately linked to a state’s dependency on 22 
 
foreign capital, trade patterns and whether the state is a net contributor or beneficiary. Building 
on Connolly’s (2009) work on financial vulnerabilities, four measures are helpful for identifying 
vulnerabilities.  In  addition  to  (the  extent  of)  net  recipient  status  shown  above,  illustrative 
measures include an openness of the economy indicator (sum of imports and exports of goods 
and services divided by GDP), a trade dependency indicator (proportion of exports to EU-27 
countries of total exports), and a debt to GDP ratio. All of these highlight the extent to which an 
economy is dependent on external factors. Whilst on these measures the three cases show signs 
of relative vulnerability although more in terms of trade rather than financial dependency (see 
tables 3a, b and c), which following the arguments of the dependency scholars could be used to 
explain why these states have generally been enthusiastic about liberalization and redistribution 
in the European Union, they are not convincing when seeking to explain stances in other areas 
such as the Lisbon/Constitutional Treaties. Hence, this economically rooted argument needs to 
be complemented with something with a more constructivist flavour.       
 
Insert tables 3a, 3b and 3c 
 
The second component of the concept of vulnerability is linked to a country’s perceived 
place in the world and questions of security. This element is harder to quantify, but it is clearly 
significant. Central to this idea is the vulnerability of labels. In the case of Slovenia, for example, 
as a liminal state frequently labelled as ‘former Yugoslav’ or ‘Western Balkan’ it sought shelter 
in the safe harbor of labels and has been keen to project itself as ‘Central Europe’, ‘Alpine’ or 
‘Mediterranean’, but also as a ‘good European’ (Lindstrom 2003; Bojinović 2005). This desire to 23 
 
be  seen  as  a  good  reliable  European  state  was  central  to  explaining  internal  consensus  on 
European issues and the desire not to rock the boat by taking positions out of kilter with the 
European mainstream. But Slovenia’s sense of insecurity also explains its willingness to rock the 
boat in December 2008 when it blocked Croatia’s accession negotiations. Fishing rights, access 
to the sea and the ‘fear’ of a large neighbor all contribute to Slovenes’ sense of vulnerability. 
There was a similar ‘insecurity discourse’ in the Slovak case.
20 Thanks to the snub at the 
Luxembourg  European  Council  in  1997  when  Slovakia  was  not  invited  to  begin  accession 
negotiations,  Slovaks  were  keen  to  demonstrate  they  were  good  Europeans.  Indeed,  once 
negotiations  began  Slovakia  resembled  an  ‘obedient  dog  faithfully  following  its  master’s 
instructions’ (Malová and Haughton 2006: 327). There are fainter echoes of these sentiments in 
the Czech case where in the early post-communist years there was initial concern about Czechs’ 
place in the world and a rhetoric of ‘catching up’ with the West where the Czech Republic felt it 
belonged (Braun 2008: 51). Although as the 1990s wore on this was replaced with a more critical 
view of the EU as the Czech Republic was firmly established in the minds of the Western 
Europeans as part of its orbit. 
All three states share three interlinked vulnerabilities. Firstly, in the sphere of security 
where the twentieth century has taught all three nations of the benefit of European co-operation 
and the need to be perceived as part of the Western European club of established democracies. 
Secondly,  size.  As  small  states  in  the  centre  of  the  continent  they  are  dependent  on  their 
neighbours not just for security, but for economics. Even euroskeptics such as Czech President 
Klaus has reiterated his belief that there was, and remains, no alternative for the Czech Republic 
                                                       
20 The term is Barbullishi’s (2009).  24 
 
to membership of the club (Klaus 2009). For such politicians membership is a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ rather than a ‘marriage of love’ (Braun 2008: 58). The third component is linked to 
globalization. The EU provides an umbrella of protection against the harsh rains of the global 
market. The first two of these vulnerabilities were in evidence in early 2009 when the Czech EU 
Presidency under premier Topolánek and his successor Jan Fischer fought hard to prevent the EU 
veering towards protectionism as the global financial crisis was beginning to bite. 
The salience of vulnerability shaping European preferences is clear in two other policy 
areas:  energy  and  Justice  and  Home  Affairs.  All  three  countries  are  heavily  dependent  on 
external sources for their energy supply and have led the calls for nuclear power. Indeed, both 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been at the forefront of the European Nuclear Energy 
Forum hosting two meetings each between November 2007 and May 2009. The insecurities 
linked  to  trade  and  openness,  but  rooted  in  geography  and  geology,  shape  these  countries’ 
stances on energy issues. Moreover, in JHA issues the three member states have generally been 
supportive of future integration in a range of areas including protection of external borders and 
the fight against organized and cross-border crime. In Slovenia, for instance, real concerns about 
its vulnerabilities have shaped a JHA stance which aims for a stronger Europol, a strong interest 
in FRONTEX and a Southeast Europe Organized Crime Threat Assessment; all intimately linked 
in to Slovenia’s deep seated fear of infiltration and exposure to organized crime stemming from 
the Western Balkans. 
Vulnerability can also explain when public opinion can matter. The thorny issue of the 
Beneš decrees and the linked concerns about Germans expelled from the Czech lands after the 
Second World War was invoked by Klaus in 2009 when he was mulling over whether to sign the 
Lisbon Treaty. His stated concern that the Charter of Fundamental Rights might open the door 25 
 
for Sudeten Germans to claim the return of property not only helped bolster Klaus’s popularity, 
but also swung public opinion away from supporting the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, conscious 
that  the  Beneš  decrees  also  applied  to  ethnic  Hungarians  who  had  lived  on  the  territory  of 
Slovakia, Prime Minister Fico was quick to appear on television to state he would also ask for a 
similar opt-out if the treaty opened the doors for Hungarian claimants. For historical reasons 
Czechs and Slovaks see their bigger neighbor, Germany and Hungary respectively, as potential 
threats to the integrity of their states.       
 
Conclusions  
Five  years  of  membership  is  too  short  a  period  upon  which  to  draw  definitive 
conclusions, nonetheless studying and seeking to explain the preferences of Slovenia, Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic in a number of policy areas highlights several salient factors in the 
process of national preference formation and some avenues for future research. 
Firstly,  and  linked  to  the  relative  novelty  of  their  membership  we  can  observe  an 
‘accession  hangover’.  Much  time  and  effort  was  placed  on  meeting  criteria,  transposing  the 
acquis  and  seeking  to  project  a  good  image  of  the  country  during  the  accession  period  of 
‘asymmetric interdependence’ (Vachudova 2005) that it has taken time to adjust to the new 
realities of being a subject and not just an objective of EU decision making and developing the 
necessary capacity. Indeed, in many respects the new member states still think like accession 
states and not member states. This is changing, but the pace of change is slow. With the passage 
of much more time we may look back on the early membership period - when the demands of 
accession cast a long shadow - as being distinctly unusual. 26 
 
Secondly, the cases of Slovenia and the Czech Republic demonstrate a clear presidency 
effect. Preferences are formed domestically and usually tweaked at the European level as part of 
a country’s integration strategy, but this tweaking may be quite substantial during the holding of 
the presidency, especially when there is a desire as in the case of Slovenia to project itself as a 
‘good and reliable European state’; a finding which has implications for broader debates amongst 
constructivists and intergovernmentalists and indeed for the debates surrounding the provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty and the changes to the nature of the EU presidency. 
Thirdly, this paper has argued that the key to a member state’s choices for Europe lies in 
vulnerabilities,  maintaining  that  this  vulnerability  is  best  understood  as  a  combination  of 
economic and financial vulnerability with a more existential vulnerability linked to questions of 
security and categorization. The bases of the vulnerabilities are not fixed in stone. Indeed, it is 
quite possible, for example, that one of the 2004 entrants will be a net contributor in the next 
decade. If the net contributor/net beneficiary status is important for shaping national preference 
formation, especially in the socio-economic sphere, and given that tapping into EU funds is the 
current priority of states like Slovakia, some significant changes may be observable in the future. 
This paper indicates a number of potentially fertile furrows for future research to plough. 
Firstly, the research was limited to three cases and certain policy areas, but clearly there would 
be merit in examining national preference formation in a larger sample of policy areas and across 
EU-27,  especially  those  other  new  member  states  which  have  been  largely  ignored  in  the 
literature most notably the Baltic States. This could be used to test and develop further the 
‘vulnerability’ based explanation.  Secondly, holding the rotating presidency of the EU appears 
to play a not insignificant role in national preference formation suggesting the merits of a large-
scale comparative study on a number of member states holding the presidency, but also the 27 
 
impact of the presidency on Czech and Slovene positions poses the question as to whether the 
impact of holding the presidency will have a lasting legacy or will fade. Thirdly, the bulk of the 
empirical period covered was one of healthy economic growth for the three states, but the global 
credit crunch and resultant recession had begun to bite by early 2009. Although one Slovene 
interviewee put it clearly that ‘the EU is part of the solution not the problem’
21, the impact of the 
crisis may bring more radical ideologies centre-stage and affect public opinion and underlying 
economic vulnerabilities.  
                                                       
21 Author’s interview with Janez Podobnik, President Slovene People’s Party 2003-8 and Environment Minister 
2004-8, Ljubljana, April 16, 2009.    
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Table 1 Overview of Slovenia’s, Slovakia’s and the Czech Republic’s Preferences 2004-9  
  Slovenia 
Stance             Change? 
Slovakia 
Stance             Change? 
Czech Republic 
Stance             Change? 
Liberalization 
 
Supportive 
of 
liberalization 
Minor  Supportive 
of 
liberalization 
Minor  Supportive of 
liberalization 
Minor 
Tax 
Harmonization  
Opposition  No change  Opposition  No,  but 
new  govt. 
wobbled in 
2006 
Opposition  No change 
Budget/EU funds  Supportive 
of 
distribution 
Some cooling  Supportive 
of 
distribution 
No change  Supportive of 
distribution 
No change 
Enlargement 
 
Enthusiastic 
support  for 
Western 
Balkans 
Dec  2008 
blocked 
Croatia’s 
negotiations 
Enthusiastic 
support  for 
Western 
Balkans 
Support 
Increased 
stressed on 
fulfilling 
criteria 
Enthusiastic 
support  for 
Western 
Balkans 
No change 
Lisbon/Constituti
onal Treaty  
Support  No change  Support, 
although 
Christian 
Democrat 
reservations 
No change  Conflictual 
views 
Yes,  amongst 
key  ODS 
politicians 
Euro entry  Support  No change  Support  No change  Conflictual 
views  
Wide variety of 
opinion 
Sources: 40 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with politicians, civil servants 
and civil society representatives in Slovakia, Slovenia and  the Czech Republic plus numerous 
documents  including  ČSSD  (2005);  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Slovenia  (2006);  KDH 
(2002); KDU-ČSL (2006); Liberalna demokracija Slovenije (2008); ĽS-HZDS (2006); National 
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (2007); National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia 
(2008);  ODS  (2006);  SDKÚ  (2002);  SDS  (2005);  Smer-sociálna  demokracia  (2006);  SMK 
(2002);  SNS  (2006);  Socilani  Demokrati  (2008);  Útvar  místopředsedy  vlády  pro  evropské 
záležitosti (2007); and Vláda Slovenskej republiky (2006) and Zares (2009).  
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Table 2 EU Dependency: Net Recipients and Net Contributors: Operating budgetary balances*  
  2004  2005  2006  2007 
 
Million 
EUR 
%GNI  Million 
EUR 
%GNI  Million 
EUR 
%GNI 
Million 
EUR  %GNI 
EUR  per 
capita 
2007** 
Greece  +4163.3  +2.27%  +3900.5  +2.00%  +5102.3  +2.43%  +5436.4  +2.43%  +485 
Lithuania  +369.3  +2.08%  +476.4  +2.34%  +585.3  +2.52%  +793.1  +2.95%  +236 
Portugal  +3124.0  +2.20%  +2378.0  +1.63%  +2291.7  +1.52%  +2474.1  +1.58%  +233 
Latvia  +197.7  +1.81%  +263.9  +2.05%  +255.5  +1.64%  +488.7  +2.55%  +215 
Estonia  +145.0  +1.59%  +154.3  +1.43%  +176.4  +1.40%  +226.2  +1.54%  +169 
Hungary  +193.4  +0.25%  +590.1  +0.71%  +1150.0  +1.34%  +1605.7  +1.72%  +160 
Ireland  +1593.8  +1.26%  +1136.6  +0.83%  +1080.5  +0.72%  +671.8  +0.42%  +153 
Poland  +1438.3  +0.73%  +1853.2  +0.78%  +2997.6  +1.15%  +5135.7  +1.75%  +135 
Slovakia  +169.2  +0.52  +270.9  +0.72%  +323.2  +0.74%  +617.7  +1.17%  +114 
Spain  +8502.3  +1.02%  +6017.8  +0.67%  +3811.7  +0.40%  +3649.5  +0.36%  +81 
Malta  +45.0  +1.01%  +90.0  +1.98%  +101.0  +2.09%  +28.1  +0.54%  +68 
Czech Rep  +272.2  +0.33%  +178.0  +0.19%  +386.2  +0.36%  +656.4  +0.55%  +64 
Bulgaria  -  -  -  -  -  -  +335  +1.17%  +44 
Slovenia   +109.7  +0.42  +101.5  +0.36%  +142.8  +0.47%  +88.5  +0.27%  +44 
Romania  -  -  -  -  -  -  +595.6  +0.51%  +28 
Cyprus  +63.5  +0.52%  +90.3  +0.69%  +102.4  +0.72%  -10.5  -0.07%  -13 
Finland  -69.6  -0.05%  -84.8  -0.05%  -241.0  -0.14%  -172  -0.10%  -32 
Italy  -2946.9  -0.21%  -2199.0  -0.15%  -1731.8  -0.12%  -2016.8  -0.13%  -34 
France  -3050.7  -0.18%  -2883.5  -0.17%  -3012.5  -0.17%  -3001.5  -0.16%  -47 
Austria  -365.1  -0.16%  -277.9  -0.11%  -301.5  -0.12%  -563.7  -0.21%  -68 
UK  -2864.9  -0.16%  -1529.0  -0.08%  -2140.2  -0.11%  -4168.2  -0.21%  -68 
Belgium  -536.1  -0.18%  -607.5  -0.20%  -709.9  0.22%  -868.9  -0.26%  -82 
Germany  -7140.4  -0.32%  -6064.3  -0.27%  -6325.2  -0.27%  -7420.2  -0.30%  -90 
Sweden  -1059.8  -0.37%  -866.9  -0.29%  -856.6  -0.27%  -995.5  -0.29%  -108 
Denmark  -224.6  -0.11%  -265.3  -0.13%  -505.2  -0.23%  -604.9  -0.26%  -111 
Netherlands  -2034.9  -0.40%  -2636.6  -0.51%  -2587.6  -0.48%  -2865.5  -0.50%  -175 
Luxembourg  -93.6  -0.39%  -86.8  -0.35%  -60.2  -0.22%  -114.9  -0.40%  -237 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_report_07_en.pdf (page 80) [accessed on 28 December 2009].*Operating 
budgetary  balanced  calculated  as  the  difference  between  allocated  operating  expenditure  and  own  resources  payment.  **calculated  using 
population statistics for 2007 published by Eurostat. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/main_tables  39 
 
 
 
Table 3a 
Openness of the 
Economy 
 
Country  2004  2005  2006  2007               
Czech Republic  140.23  141.25  149.67  155.31               
Slovakia  151.62  157.09  172.69  173.97               
Slovenia  117.30  124.85  133.77  141.63               
EU-27average  108.24       112.49  119.28  120.15               
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Washington: D.C:   
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135  
Accessed 30 
October 2009                               
 
Table 3b 
Exports to EU-27 (% of 
total)                 
Country  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Slovakia  87  87  87  87  90 
Slovenia  68  67  67  67  65 
Czech Republic  86  84  84  83  83 
EU-27 average  70 
 
68  68  68  66           
                   
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics: http://www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/      
Accessed 30 October 2009  
 
Table 3c  
External Debt to GDP 
 
Country  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008           
Czech Republic  0.41  0.37  0.40  0.44  0.37           
Slovak Republic  0.70  0.76  0.83  0.94  0.96           
Slovenia  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.03           
EU-27 Average  1.81  1.71  2.05  2.26  1.93           
         
Source: GDP data from World Bank Development Indicators  
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135  
                             
Gross External Debt from International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, New York:  
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/        40 
 
Accessed 30 October 2009  41 
 
 